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and "successful reformers" in the region, 2 or "good pupils of the IMF" who followed its "commandments religiously."
3 Studying these countries' experiences with economic reforms supported by IFIs provides an opportunity to increase understanding of the relationship between economic reforms, the level of social welfare provision, and political instability in the region and elsewhere.
This article addresses an important question: has economic liberalization as promoted by the IMF and World Bank had a negative impact on formal social welfare provisions in the Middle East? Assuming this has been the case, one would expect economic reforms to be associated with higher unemployment, increased poverty, and worsened inequities. This article argues that by weakening social welfare provisions, promoters of economic reform (the IMF and World Bank) undermined the pro-Western regimes of Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco's most significant source of authority, which would have provided legitimacy not only to reforms, but also to the regimes themselves, which the Washington-based institutions sought to support. Tunisia is an exception among the four countries examined, because it refused to compromise the social aspect of reform. In the other three countries, the weakening of social safety nets created a gap that has been filled by the faith-based organizations through their vast charity networks. This, we argue, played a key role in enhancing the legitimacy of political Islam at the expense of incumbent regimes. This article investigates the link between economic liberalization and poverty, equity, and social welfare provisions in a detailed country-case study approach. The data in the analysis are taken from international agencies (such as the World Bank and the IMF) and national surveys. Since both sets of data have limitations, using data from both international agencies and national surveys is deemed as a complimentary and appropriate approach to overcome the "limitations" of each data set. 4 We should also emphasize that while the article does not ignore the pre-1980s decades, its emphasis is mainly on the 1983-2004 period. The reason for focusing on this time period is that the early and mid-1980s were associated with economic collapse and weakening of statist policies implemented following independence throughout the region. The 1980s brought rapid economic reform, liberalization, and transition to more market-oriented policies, especially within the four countries studied in this article. 5 It is therefore appropriate to study the link between economic reform and social welfare provision through the experiences of Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia during this post-1983 transitional period. Studying the links between economic reform and social welfare, especially among the four countries being considered, exposes reasons behind the outbreak of the Arab Spring in late 2010 and early 2011 that have not been thoroughly discussed in the current literature. While most Western observers base their explanations on political factors, particularly the demand for democracy and political freedom, this article suggests that economic factors rooted in the neoliberal reforms that began in the early 1980s provide stronger explanations. The article, however, does not analyze the main developments that occurred, and continue to occur in the postArab Spring in its analysis, since these remain incomplete and are still unfolding.
ECONOMIC REFORM AND SOCIAL WELFARE
In the period between independence and the economic collapse of the 1980s, the four countries studied -Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia -all had a strong implicit social contract. Under this contract, the state provided various forms of social welfare, including free health care and education, subsidized food and utilities, and guaranteed jobs in an overextended public sector. In return, these provisions garnered loyalty from the population for the political regimes in power. This section of the article evaluates whether the following period of economic reforms under the IMF and World Bank led to a breakdown of this social contract with a retrenchment of the state in terms of social services and a resulting increase of poverty and decrease in social welfare. In general, IMF austerity programs, which aim to stabilize the economies of recipient countries, are often associated with fiscal austerity and a decline in public expenditure, including that on social welfare, which often bears significant social implications.
The four sample countries started IMF and World Bank-guided reforms at different times. Morocco was the first in 1983, followed by Tunisia in 1986, Jordan in 1989, and Egypt in 1991. Despite starting in different years, all four programs displayed similar characteristics. The IFI prescriptions were designed in a package of policy reform known as structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and stabilization that was typical of the IMF and World Bank. The policies carried out in the four case countries did not differ greatly from those prescribed by these international institutions to developing countries in other regions, such as Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. In the Middle East and North Africa, just as elsewhere, IFIs operated on the conditions outlined in the "Washington Consensus" that demanded stabilization measures calling for massive cuts in public spending, new and broader taxes, and high, positive interest rates. The structural adjustment policies administered by IFIs also called for immediate trade liberalization combined with large currency devaluations, massive reduction in tariffs, and elimination of non-tariff barriers. Privatization of state-owned enterprises, along with deregulation of financial systems and prices, also figured prominently in every SAP package signed with national governments. 6 The available empirical evidence suggests the social implications of reform in the Arab world, despite their injection of a strong poverty focus in the 1990s, has been disappointing. While surveying eight countries that accepted cooperation with the IMF and World Bank in the 1980s (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Sudan, Turkey, Algeria, and Mauritania), M. Riad El-Ghonemy found that, despite improvement in macroeconomic indicators, the social situation in each reforming country became "worse than before reform." Not only did unemployment and poverty increase, but income inequality also worsened in seven of the eight countries, with Tunisia as the exception. 7 Another study found that the negative social impact of reform had been more severe in countries that were subject to international pressure to globalize rapidly, known as the "good pupils" of the IMF: Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, and Algeria. In those four states, unemployment, poverty, and inequality were not only much worse in the late 1990s than earlier in the decade, but also relative to other states that either followed the commandments of the IMF and World Bank less religiously or did not cooperate with them at all, such as Syria and Iran. Empirical evidence drawn from our four country case studies supports this trend.
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Jordan
Large-scale and systemic official corruption, macroeconomic mismanagement, an unfavorable shift in the external environment, and poor policy advice from international financial institutions were all key factors in Jordan's 1989 currency and banking crisis. Immediately following the outbreak of the crisis, the Jordanian government agreed to its first SAPs and stabilization programs, which marked the beginning of what became a marathon of these programs that lasted for more than 15 years, until 2005.
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The IMF and World Bank-backed programs immediately imposed severe fiscal austerity measures on the Jordanian economy, which already suffered from contracted economic activities, a high level of foreign debt, and inflation. These factors led to the collapse of the Jordanian dinar, which lost almost 50% of its value in early 1989. Furthermore, the IMF insisted on expenditure reduction in a country where "expenditures were also rigid, leaving little scope for expenditure savings."
11 As Jordan was unable to reduce payments on interest or military expenditures (the largest two expenditure items in the budget), austerity measures disproportionately affected the poor, since the remaining budget items were largely social programs. These austerity measures reduced food and energy subsidies, froze public sector wages and employment, and introduced new cost recovery charges for education and health. Food subsidies alone, which in 1989 made up 7% of government expenditure, or 3.3% of gross domestic product 10. It is important to note here that Jordan, which presumably graduated from IMF support in 2005, was forced to return to the international institution seven years later in July 2012. In that year, Jordan signed yet another $2 billion stabilization loan, which is seen as response to Jordan's renewed economic woes. The country has been hit by high oil prices and affected by the political unrest caused by the Arab Spring in neighboring countries, as well as rent-seeking activities in the economy and high levels of official corruption. For more details, see, Lesley Wroughton and Andrew Torchia, "IMF Agrees to Lend $2 Billion to Jordan," Reuters, July 25, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/ article/2012/07/25/us-jordan-loan-imf-idUSBRE86O1BJ20120725.
11 These immediate cuts in food subsidies were accompanied by measures that gradually lifted energy subsidies and increased utility prices. A new sales tax was introduced in 1994, after four years of delay, at a 7% rate, rising to 10% in 1995, and then to 13% in 1999, after which it was converted into a general sales tax (GST). 13 Naturally, introducing such severe austerity under these circumstances confronted the government with serious poverty and unemployment problems. The situation was exacerbated by the return of more than 300,000 Jordanians in 1991 and 1992 after the First Gulf War. According to the World Bank, the share of the population living under the poverty line jumped from 3% in 1987 to over 14% in 1992, before declining to under 12% in the late 1990s. Similar upward trends were also observed with regard to unemployment (see Table 1 ), but these figures remain highly controversial. Other sources estimated the number of Jordanians living under the poverty line to have risen by two-thirds between 1987 and 1991, up to 19.8%. 14 The government of Jordan itself has been less optimistic than the IMF and World Bank regarding the levels of poverty and unemployment in the country, stating that "depending upon the definitions used, anywhere from fifteen to more than thirty percent of the population falls below the poverty threshold." The same condition "applies to unemployment," the Jordanian government added. During the IMF austerity period, when subsidies were greatly reduced, Jordan's social safety net remained weak. In that time, Jordan's National Aid Fund (NAF) emerged as the most "comprehensive" and "single state-funded social safety net for the poor and most vul-nerable segments of Jordanian society."
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17 The NAF's new role was consistent with the IMF's and World Bank's vision, which both sought to substitute the NAF for Jordan's previous general subsidy program as a mechanism and to enhance the quality of public spending. Even the IMF officials, though, acknowledged that "NAF [had major] coverage limitations." 18 The government of Jordan itself also admitted that the percentage of poor persons receiving NAF recurrent cash assistance to total poor did not exceed 40% in best circumstances.
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In conjunction with reduced formal safety nets, traditional, informal, and familybased social protection in Jordan -largely relied upon prior to 1989 to smooth occasional welfare shocks -also decreased during the reform period. The rapid rise in poverty and unemployment undermined the traditional family source of welfare support. 20 Poor Jordanian families' ability to participate in social ceremonies and networks (an important mechanism to build social capital) was weakened because they "could not afford having a social life or attending social events like wedding parties or exchanging visits with their neighbours . . ."
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Following the stabilization phase of reform, Jordan witnessed two spurts of economic growth in the period under analysis: 1992-95, when growth registered an annual average of 8.6%, and 2000-2004, when it averaged 4.81%. However, we have shown elsewhere 22 that this growth was not sustained. Rather than a sustainable growth brought about by productivity increases, the growth Jordan saw under stabilization and SAPs was largely extensive and unsustainable, brought about by factor accumulation. In addition, much of the growth was in non-tradable sectors, particularly the construction sector, contrary to sustainable export-led growth one would normally expect from World Bank reform programs. The brief period of growth from 1992 to 1995 was accompanied by poverty reduction, but Jordan's growth spurt in the 1990s was much more short-lived than those in Egypt and Morocco, and as a result, the decline in poverty from 14.4% in 1992 to 11.7% in the late 1990s was less marked (see Table 1 ). Jordan's first growth phase was not sustained and, as growth collapsed, poverty again increased from 11.7% of the population in 1997 to anywhere between 15% and 30% by 2002, according to government estimations (see Table 1 ). Hence, by 2002, after over a decade of IMF and World Bank-guided reforms, poverty rose significantly past its 1987 level of 3.0%. In addition, unemployment also rose during the reform period from 8% in 1987 to 15.3 % in 2002 (see Table 1 ).
It is difficult to ascribe causation to reform programs in terms of the increase in poverty and unemployment. 23 However, some of the increase in poverty and unemployment in Jordan was undoubtedly a result of the reform measures introduced. As argued above, fiscal austerity under the IMF led to cutbacks in government expenditure on social welfare, reduced employment in the public sector, a freeze on civil service wages and salaries, as well as reductions in subsidies. World Bank reforms such as privatization and trade liberalization contributed to unemployment, while reforms in the agricultural sector such as the removal of subsidies on farm production costs led to increased rural impoverishment.
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Egypt
The broad welfare state in place since the Nasserist revolution has demonstrated the tremendous strides Egypt has made in improving different dimensions of social welfare since 1952. The aggressive ration and subsidy program was effective in protecting food security for the majority of the population, and the system favored the poor relatively more than the rich. 25 Income distribution remained fairly stable and even improved somewhat in the 1980s as a result of both economic growth and distributive policies, including land redistribution. By 1991, when the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) was launched, Egypt had a more egalitarian income distribution than many comparable countries. Despite the large improvements in Egypt's social welfare indicators in the 1980s, the onset of economic crisis at the end of that decade hampered continued improvements, and it was evident poverty was exacerbating and the government's social safety net was inadequate.
26
After a long period of economic growth, the Egyptian economy faced crisis by the end of the 1980s. Growth had been based on a rentier economy model with rents in the form of aid, migrant remittances, oil, and Suez Canal revenue, boosting an otherwise inward-looking and interventionist economy. With the collapse of global oil prices in the 1980s, this model of growth could no longer be sustained; and by the later part of the decade, Egypt faced a major external debt problem, high inflation, a large budget deficit, and an unsustainable balance of payments.
Egypt's support for the Allies in the First Gulf War brought a huge debt forgiveness package and an IMF and World Bank policy-based lending program designed to promote economic liberalization. The first phase of the reform program consisted of a rapid period of stabilization in which the fiscal deficit was dramatically improved, inflation fell, and the nominal exchange rate stabilized. This attracted a large surge of capital inflow, and Egypt managed to avoid the financial sector and currency crises typically associated with such inflows. Structural adjustment, however, was much slower. Although progress was made in trade liberalization and privatization, Egypt remained a largely inward-looking economy, and the growth that materialized in the 1990s was based on domestic demand, not export-led growth. By the turn of the century, this growth had slowed considerably, and in 2004 a more reformist government was appointed by President Husni Mubarak to speed up the pace of structural reform.
Despite a well-planned poverty alleviation strategy for the reform period as articulated by the World Bank, 27 including the prioritization of subsidies and social welfare expenditure for the neediest, protection of government expenditure on health and educa- tion, and the creation of a social fund. However, not all of the strategy was implemented during the ERSAP. As a result, poverty trends were mixed during the reform period. Two household income, expenditure, and consumption surveys carried out in 1995/96 and 1999/2000, enabling the World Bank and the Egyptian government to present a detailed analysis of poverty trends in the reform period, 28 and it is possible to construct a detailed picture of poverty trends in the first decade of the ERSAP as presented in Table 2 . Table 2 shows that according to two measures, namely the national poverty line head count and the US $2/day measure, poverty worsened between 1990/91 and 1995/96. If this was indeed so, this is not surprising. The rapid stabilization program in the first half of the 1990s took place before the government had sensitized itself to the issue of poverty. It seems that there was a willingness to push for stabilization and liberalization despite short-term negative social consequences, because of the expectation that eventually growth would trickle down. Other studies also confirm this trend.
29 By contrast, in the second half of the 1990s, all indicators show an unambiguous reduction in poverty levels. Again, this is not surprising. By the mid-1990s, the difficult phase of rapid stabilization, including swift improvement in the government's deficit, had been successfully completed. Structural reforms were only slowly implemented, and the government embarked upon a more expansionary policy that brought a short phase of economic growth. According to the World Bank, the moderate poverty improvements of the latter part of the 1990s were the first since the early 1980s, and its 2002 report indicated that by 1999/2000, poverty in Egypt stood at 16.7% using the lower national poverty line. The 2002 World Bank report also dissected regional trends in poverty. Even though Egypt's overall poverty levels improved between 1995/96 and 1999/2000, with the greatest improvement in the Greater Cairo metropolitan area and moderate improvement in Lower Egypt, this was not the case for Upper Egypt. In Upper Eypt, the poverty incidence increased substantially from 29.3% to 34.2% in rural areas and from 10.8% to 19.3% in urban areas. The depth and severity of poverty also increased in Upper Egypt, which has traditionally been the poorest region in Egypt. As a result, the previous national urban/rural poverty divide was replaced by a regional poverty divide. The reason for the new regional poverty divide was the regionally biased pattern of growth during the late 1990s. Import-substituting manufacturing, the construction sector, and trade fueled by expansionary policies grew rapidly in the second half of the 1990s. These activities were concentrated around Greater Cairo and Lower Egypt, while Upper Egypt experienced virtually no growth. Lower Egypt and metropolitan Cairo thus experienced reduced poverty and job growth as the three abovementioned sectors developed in the north.
The above indicators of poverty have all used money metrics. However, another indicator that confirms the pattern observed above is child malnutrition. In the first half of the 1990s, there was an alarming increase in the percentage of children under five years of age who were malnourished and underweight. This is not surprising given that we have already seen that this was a period in which stabilization was aggressively pursued with little concern for social welfare and, thus, poverty as a whole increased relative the national poverty line.
In spite of the rosy gloss put on poverty trends in the second half of the 1990s by the World Bank, 32 bank officials acknowledge that poverty is likely to have increased since 2000 and that the poverty and employment gains of the second half of the 1990s were probably unsustainable. 33 Using the 2004/5 Household Survey, poverty was estimated to have increased to 19.6% nationwide compared to 16.74% in 1999/2000 using the lower national poverty line, while for Upper Egypt the figure was around 40% in 2004/5. One of the main reasons for this seems to be that of rising prices in the face of both devaluation of the Egyptian pound and reductions in subsidies. In fact, despite robust economic growth between 2004 and 2008, the available empirical evidence points to a definite increase in poverty levels in Egypt. As David J. Lynch noted:
Although the last ambitious economic reforms launched in 2004 have won plaudits from the business community they have done little for the average Egyptian. Poverty, in fact, has increased slightly over the past three years despite an economy growing at an annual rate of about 7%. That disconnect raises questions about whether the government can sustain its reforms amid mounting labor unrest and a generalized air of complaint. to 8.6%. To quote the 2002 World Bank report: "Given that poverty in Egypt is shallow, there is a chance that many of those whom escaped poverty during the 1995-2000 period may have slipped back into poverty again." 35 Summarizing the above, it would seem that during the ERSAP period, Egypt experienced mixed results in terms of the social consequences of stabilization and structural adjustment. In the first half of the 1990s, stabilization was aggressively pursued with little regard for poverty and social welfare. As a result, the percentage of the population below the national poverty line increased, along with the rate of child malnutrition. In the second half of the 1990s, there was a spurt of economic growth, and poverty for Egypt as a whole fell (although not for Upper Egypt), employment increased, 36 and unemployment fell. However, this growth was not sustained; and since 2000, poverty and unemployment have again been increasing. Taking these trends for the reform period as a whole, many Egyptians feel their living standards have declined since ERSAP was launched in 1991. Many Egyptians also believe that poverty has worsened and are now looking to alternative sources of welfare provision. 37 
Morocco
Morocco, like many other MENA states, has a long history of populist state welfare provision in the form of an implicit social contract, whereby the state provides for its citizens in return for loyalty to the regime. However, although the country has made huge strides in improving social welfare since its 1956 independence, most of its social welfare indicators remain at levels below those of comparable lower middleincome countries. This is because Morocco's state welfare provision, although based on a populist model, has been biased towards urban areas and the elites.
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A weakness of social policy in Morocco is the inadequacy of its social safety net to protect the most vulnerable, to the degree that indicators like child malnutrition are much higher than in comparable countries. Most of Morocco's safety net programs are ad hoc and fail to catch many of the poor when they are adversely affected by liveli-35. World Bank, Arab Republic of Egypt (2002), p.v. 36. Exports did little to help address poverty and unemployment in Egypt as indicated by the stagnant share of labor-intensive products in the export basket since 1990 and the growth of capitalintensive exports. Growth was concentrated in the non-tradable sectors serving the domestic market: construction, inward-looking manufacturing, services, and government employment, which, given the limited size of the domestic market spending on non-tradables were not sustainable sources of income growth as seen by the decline in growth after 2000.
37. Like Jordan, Egypt has also turned to the IMF for support in recent years. However, negotiations between the IMF and the Egyptian Government for a US $4.5 billion, 22-month stabilization program "have been going on for almost three years without a deal being struck." Reforming the subsidy system in particular has proved to be a sticking point in the negotiations, with the IMF insisting on reforming the whole subsidy system while the Egyptian government fears that such a move would further destabilize the country. hood shocks. The country's lack of an organized social safety net became particularly evident during the stabilization policies of the mid-late 1980s, when the poor were hit by subsidy reductions and increased living costs.
In the midst of the economic crisis of the early 1980s, austerity measures and structural reform measures were introduced in Morocco under the auspices of the IMF and World Bank. Trends in poverty and social welfare have fluctuated since these programs were implemented and follow a similar pattern to those witnessed in Egypt. In the first part of the 1980s, poverty and social welfare both deteriorated. With the development of export-led growth from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, poverty declined significantly. However, this was not sustained and in the economic slowdown of the 1990s, poverty crept back up again to levels commensurate with the early 1980s. During the period of 2000-2004, Morocco experienced an economic upturn, and poverty again declined, but much of this growth was based on domestic demand rather than on exports.
Morocco launched its IMF and World Bank-guided reform program in 1983, when King Hasan II turned to the IFIs. This led to a ten-year stabilization program promoted by the IMF, accompanied by a series of structural adjustment and sectoral loans with the World Bank aimed at addressing Morocco's macroeconomic and structural imbalances. As in Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere, the Fund and the Bank called for, fiscal consolidation in return for support, among other things. Fiscal consolidation in Morocco was achieved by reducing absorption, mainly by lowering public investment. Government capital expenditure fell in real terms by half between 1983 and 1986, with significant negative consequences for development and operations of both economic infrastructural and social facilities. Cutting public investment and raising interest rates (a key condition in the IMF's stabilization package) also drastically reduced private investment, especially in rural areas, where large segments of the population lived. In addition, Morocco's entire rural economy depends heavily on public investment for infrastructure, extension services, fertilizers, and mechanization. Reducing public investment in rural areas led to delays in the maintenance of infrastructure (transportation, telecommunication, etc.) and social sector services (education, health, training, houses, etc.), with severe implications for the poor in rural areas.
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The initial years of reforms in Morocco also involved severe fiscal austerity in the form of a civil service wage freeze from 1981-85, limited public sector recruitment to 10,000 per year for three years, higher taxation, a cut in subsidies causing a rise in sugar, oil, and flour prices by 30%, 52%, and 87%, respectively. In addition, the prices of about 45 products were decontrolled between 1983 and 1985, and the price of subsidized food, fertilizers, electricity, water, and petroleum were increased. Overall, the IFI reform measures in Morocco were considered a success; the budget deficit was reduced from 10.9% of GDP in 1983/84 to 2.6% in 1992/93, and inflation was brought under control and declined from 12.5% in 1984 to less than 3% in 1988. The social impact of stabilization programs in Morocco, however, was dramatic. As in Jordan, figures regarding poverty and unemployment have been contentious and highly debatable. For example, while the official unemployment rate in Morocco was 17% in 1989, "in reality [unemployment was] probably closer to 20-25%."
41 Similarly, the unofficial, but generally recognized poverty rates were much higher than publicly published figures. Anecdotal evidence (such as a decline in the primary school enrollment rate, continued high illiteracy rate, or rapid rural-urban migration) suggested higher poverty rates than formally recognized. In fact, the social impact of IFI programs introduced in the early 1980s was so traumatizing that the Moroccan government terminated its agreement with the IMF in 1993, although it continued to collaborate with the World Bank on sectoral basis. 42 The stabilization effort of the early 1980s brought a brief contraction in economic growth, but growth resumed during the period from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. However, the improved growth rate was a result of exceptionally good weather conditions and growth in the export sector, not IMF austerity measures. During this period, official poverty rates fell (see Table 3 ) from 21% in 1984 to 13% by 1991. The success came from generating labor-intensive economic growth that created considerable employment opportunities for the poor.
Poverty reduction in urban areas was driven by government policies to boost industry and exploit Morocco's historically close ties with the EU. This led to rapid expansion of employment in the manufacturing sector, especially in export-oriented enterprises such as textiles, leather, and agro-industries, and by a rapid growth in the informal sector. Labor-intensive growth was partly due to the relative decline in labor costs and an increase in capital costs. Throughout the period, real wages fell, particularly in the manufacturing sector, where there was a move toward temporary low-skilled employment. But employment gains more than compensated for this in terms of the impact on poverty, and increases in the minimum wage protected the very poor. benefited the country's irrigated areas, the latter provided a major source of employment for the rural poor, who relied more on wage employment than on land ownership. The rise in the agricultural minimum wage also helped alleviate rural poverty. Hence agriculture made a major contribution to the increase in rural incomes.
Government expenditure trends also contributed to the decline in poverty in the late 1980s and early 1990s. After an initial sharp reduction in government expenditures in the first phase of stabilization between 1983 and 1988, expenditure started to rise again at the end of the 1980s. The Moroccan government made a firm effort to protect social expenditures, with public expenditure on health only falling from 1.1% of GDP to 0.9% of GDP between 1982 and 1991, and expenditure on education only falling from 6.2% GDP to 5.3%.
Macroeconomic stabilization, particularly in the form of inflation reduction, and financial sector reform, including higher interest rates and exchange rate polices, also contributed to a surge in migrant remittances, which by 1991 accounted for 11% of private consumption and 7.5% of GDP. These remittances played an important role in boosting incomes, including those of the poor. The World Bank estimated that about 180,000, or 5% of the estimated poor in 1991, would be added to the number of the poor in Morocco if it were not for transfers from abroad. 44 However, although poverty fell from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, a large number of the population remained close to the poverty line and thus vulnerable to even small deteriorations in economic conditions. This was clearly illustrated during the 1990s when an economic slowdown, particularly in the manufacturing sector, and droughts reduced growth to an annual average of only 2% and increased poverty from 13% in 1991 to 19% in 2000 (see Table 3 ).
The rise in poverty rates to 19% in the latter part of the 1990s meant that 5.3 million were poor in Morocco. During the 1990s, the number of people just above the poverty line also increased such that 12 million were economically vulnerable. The depth and severity of poverty also increased during the latter 1990s particularly in rural areas. For example, the number of extreme poor, that is, those living beneath the food poverty line (the threshold that distinguishes those with only enough means to maintain minimum caloric intake required for survival) increased in rural areas from 255,000 people in 1990/91 to 844,000 in 1998/99. This increase in poverty occurred despite an increase in government expenditure on social protection from 9% of GDP in the late 1980s to 12.5% in 1998, equivalent to 43% of total government expenditure.
The aforementioned economic slowdown of the 1990s can be partly explained by an appreciation of the real exchange rate (which appreciated by 17% in the 1990s), poor infrastructure, drought (one almost every two years during the 1990s), and a decline in agricultural investment. External causes of Morocco's economic slowdown included the economic recession in Europe, a slowdown in direct foreign investment (DFI), and deterioration in terms of trade resulting from falling phosphate prices and rising oil prices due to the crisis in the Middle East. Growth turned negative in 1992 and 1993 and remained low for the rest of the decade. During this period, unemployment grew and low labor productivity meant that real wages could not be increased without losing international competitiveness. Though increasing labor productivity 44 in Morocco became essential for further poverty reduction, and it did not materialize. Demographic pressures also added to the unemployment and poverty increase. Between 1985 and the end of the 1990s, unemployment rose from 11.5% to 15%, with most of the increase concentrated in urban areas. The growth of urban unemployment during the 1990s was fueled by rural-urban migration, and to a lesser extent, by population growth and rising labor force participation rates. The appreciation of the real exchange rate during this period also had adverse effects on unemployment by encouraging a return to more capital-intensive production methods. Urban unemployment peaked in 1995 at 23%. One marked feature of the increase in unemployment has been the extent to which it has affected the young and the educated. Growing urban unemployment has been accompanied by an increase in urban slums. 45 Although poverty remains predominantly rural in Morocco, the 2004 Census on Population and Housing showed a clear increase in the incidence of urban poverty.
According to other non-income indicators, poverty also increased in the early 1990s. For example, between 1987 and 1992, the nutritional status of children declined. Non-income measures of poverty were adversely affected by the fact that not enough income was channeled into categories of public spending that help the poor, such as primary health and education, and essential infrastructure services. In addition, the quality of health care and education deteriorated as expenditures failed to keep pace with population growth. The growth of poverty during the 1990s has led the Bank to conclude that although Morocco was successful in the mid-late 1980s in terms of growth and poverty reduction, this fell short in the 1990s. 46 As growth picked up again after 2000, official sources concluded that poverty had fallen to 14% in 2005. However, the official figures were considered highly contentious, and no more accurate figures for poverty rates existed. The World Bank reported that 2005 poverty levels remained the same level as they were in 2000 (see Table 3 ). It is true that between 2000 and 2004, GDP growth increased to 4.5% per annum with strong growth in agriculture due to favorable weather (agricultural growth accelerated from -1.3% in the 1990s to an annual average of 8.2% in the early years of the 2000s) and in manufacturing, services, tourism, and information technology. But the employment opportunities as a result of this growth have not been sufficiently high enough to make an effective difference in poverty or even unemployment. According to World Bank officials, Morocco's economy needs an annual average growth rate of 7-8% in order to cause a real dent in poverty and unemployment. A 5% growth rate, they add, will only prevent the current levels of poverty and unemployment from deteriorating. 47 It remains to be seen whether the growth upturn of the 2000s translates into sustainable long-term growth and poverty reduction. Much of this growth is based on remittances and tourism receipts, along with growth of domestic demand and agriculture as opposed to being export-driven.
Poverty reduction in Morocco has been firmly on the World Bank's agenda for the new millennium. In the 2005-9 Country Assistance Strategy, the "overarching objective" of the strategy was poverty reduction in response to lackluster economic growth, 45 inadequate social indicators relative to the country's income levels, and high unemployment. 48 Coinciding with a greater Bank emphasis on poverty and social exclusion was a major reorientation of government policy in the same direction. Shocked by the vast disparities between rural and urban areas, as well as by a rapid rise in the level of poverty and unemployment, the government introduced in 1997 the Social Priority Program. The accession to the throne of King Muhammad VI in 1999 marked a major turning point in political and social policy in Morocco. Under the new king, not only was economic reform sped up, but considerable emphasis was placed on social policy.
tunisia
Unlike Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco, the implementation of IFI policy packages did not lead to an increase in poverty or the disengagement of the state in social provisioning in Tunisia. On the contrary, throughout the 20 years of structural adjustment starting in 1986, the Tunisian government reformed, but preserved its strong role in social provisioning. In contrast, social provisioning in the 1980s under IFI structural reforms in Jordan and Egypt fell significantly, though to a lesser degree in Morocco. As a result, poverty in Tunisia declined considerably, while inequality remained stable under the country's structural adjustment period. Admittedly, there remained some pockets of poverty, especially in rural areas, and social problems such as unemployment persisted, but overall, it can be argued that Tunisia was successful in implementing structural reforms while simultaneously reducing poverty. This case study of Tunisia's poverty rate over its structural adjustment period exemplifies why the reduction in social spending under IFI-administered reforms exacerbates rather than reduces poverty levels.
Commitment to social development has always been part of the Tunisian government's priorities. Since gaining independence in 1956, social spending remained high, making it one of the Tunisian state's key characteristics. In 2004, social spending represented 16-20% of GDP, depending on the measure, and in 2003, social transfers were equal to 258.4 Tunisian dinars (TD) per household per month, equal to 1.2 times the guaranteed minimum wage. Between the early 1980s and early 2000s, Tunisia was the highest social spender in the MENA region. There was particularly large spending in education, health, and diverse social welfare programs such as maternity benefits, food subsidies, and aid for poor families. These large social transfers translated into impressive social achievements. Most impressive has been the reduction in poverty; according to the INS, 22% of the population lived under the national poverty line in 1975, and by 1985 this rate was reduced to 7.7%. Improvements in human indicators were equally impressive, particularly for women. Overall, the commitment to social policies prior to structural reform translated to a dramatic improvement in the well-being of a majority of Tunisians.
In 1986, Tunisia implemented stabilization and structural reforms in association with the World Bank and the IMF. The reforms were a relative success, with key macroeconomic indicators stabilized and -unlike Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco -continued economic growth during the stabilization phase. The structural adjustment phase was very gradual and implemented through a 20-year period, consisting of the traditional structural reform policies: trade liberalization, financial liberalization, price liberalization, and privatization. The reforms were relatively successful in diversifying the economy and maintaining relatively high growth rates, but little improvement was made in private investment levels and employment creation between 1986 and 2005.
The implementation of structural reforms in 1986 could, in theory, have jeopardized the commitment to social provision in Tunisia and led to an increase in poverty. In fact, just before the reform, there were signs that the World Bank and IMF might push for a reduction in Tunisia's social spending. In 1983 these IFIs were quite influential in pushing for reform of Tunisia's food subsidy system, which at the time cost almost 4% of GDP, sucking out fragile government finance. Under the IFI-designed food subsidy reforms in 1984, the prices of wheat, flour, and semolina were increased by 70% and the price of bread by 100%. The reform inevitably led to a month of street riots that spread across the country, after which the state abolished the price increases and calm was restored. The Tunisian government learned from the failure of the drastic 1984 food subsidy reform and subsequently succeeded in preserving social policy throughout the structural reforms that began in 1986.
During the two phases of structural reforms (1987-94 and 1995-2005) , social spending as a proportion of GDP remained around 19%, representing a twofold increase in social spending in constant terms. Social transfer per habitant increased by 55%, from 386 TD in 1987 (representing four-fifths of the minimum wage) to 599.3 TD in 2002 (representing 1.2 times the minimum wage). 49 Apart from the country's food subsidy system, the General Compensation Fund (GCF), all sectors saw an increase in spending in constant terms: spending on education and health both doubled between 1987 and 2002, while social welfare spending increased by 214% -an average annual increase of 13.4%.
During the 1986-2002 period, the Tunisian government was under pressure from the World Bank to reform its social protection system, 50 and to some extent the Tunisian government responded to many of those pressures. For example, the government reformed the food subsidy system and the health compensation system. But the government also created new institutions that systematically compensated those who lost due to these reforms. Furthermore, the period was characterized by an expansion of the social security system, which, however, was not financed by the government budget.
One significant reform during the adjustment program concerns the GCF, which led to the most drastic drop in spending by the government. After the bread riots of 1984, the government opted for a self-targeted system with a gradual reduction in subsidies. In effect, government spending on the GCF decreased by almost 52%. However, Mahmoud Ben Romdhane highlights that each increase in basic food prices tended to be followed by an increase in the minimum wage. Furthermore, in order to compensate the poor for the increase in basic food prices, the National Program for Aid to Needy Families (NAPNF) was created in 1986. Under this scheme, households received on average 478 TD per annum, in addition to free medical care. In all, during Tunisia's structural adjustment period, there was great expansion of the social security system with twofold increase in membership and a large increase in amount spent in contributions, with pensions and health care capturing the largest share in expenditure. 51 The most significant change in social provisioning during the reform period, or, rather, the most original one, was the creation of presidential programs by President Zine El-'Abedine Ben 'Ali. These programs were partly financed by the government, but most funding came from the private sector. 52 The two most important programs were the National Solidarity Fund (NSF, or Project 26:26) and the National Job Fund (NJF, or Project 21:21). Created in 1993, the NSF offered a series of programs directed at low-income groups, covering basic needs and services that were not provided by existing public institutions. The NJF was set up in 2000 to promote job creation and provide support for micro-investment projects and job training. These programs likely contributed to some improvements in social conditions and, to some extent cushioned the impact of the second phase of the IFI reforms. The presidential programs cost little to the government, since a majority of the funding came from the private sector through the form of supposedly voluntary contribution by employers. As a result, a large proportion of social provisioning in Tunisia was directly financed by the private sector during the structural adjustment period, allowing the government to increase social provisioning while keeping its budget under control (simultaneously satisfying the IMF and World Bank budget deficit targets).
Overall, despite some reduction in social spending in the GCF, the structural adjustment period in Tunisia was one of expansion in social provision, with increased spending per capita in education, health, and social welfare throughout. As a result, that period also translated into impressive improvement in the social conditions of most Tunisians, with a significant decrease in poverty between 1986 and 2002, continuing the trend of the 1960s to 1980s.
After the reduction in poverty from 22% to 9.6% in the 1975-85 period, poverty continued to decrease. By 2000, the poverty rate reached 4.1%; a drop in the number of people under the poverty line from 500,000 in 1985 to 400,000 in 2000 (see Table 4 ). However, poverty rates increased between 1990 and 1995 from 6.7% to 8.1%, mainly because of droughts between 1993 and 1995 that impacted agricultural production. 53 The second half of the 1990s largely compensated for that increase, and poverty was halved between 1995 and 2000. (Ironically, this drop occurred in the most intensive liberalization phase in Tunisia.) Table 4 shows that there are strong regional disparities and that poverty is particularly concentrated in the west of the country. The north, northwest, and center-east, which benefited from particularly strong growth rates through tourism and offshore activities, are the regions that saw the most impressive drops in poverty.
Consumption poverty reduction in Tunisia has been matched by a drop in capability poverty. Education has seen the most improvement in both primary and secondary levels. Tunisia's adult literacy rate has also increased dramatically from 53% in 1984 to 86% in 2000. Women remained behind, with 17% of adult women still illiterate. Reduction in consumption poverty has also been accompanied by an improvement in health status. Tunisian women and men lived, respectively, nine and seven years longer in 2004 as compared to 1985, while the under-five child mortality rate was reduced from 70 per 1,000 live births in 1985 to 25.4 per 1,000 live births. Tunisia has achieved better health indicators than average for lower-middle and middle-income countries.
55
Infrastructure data are scarce, but by combining World Bank data with National Household Survey data, it can be shown that there has been a large improvement in access to basic infrastructure by the poor in both urban and rural areas, but with rural population still lagging behind urban population. During Tunisia's structural reform, reduction in poverty was stronger in urban than rural areas. Between 1985 and 2000, poverty decreased by 65% in urban areas, but only decreased by 56% in rural areas. As such, the structural reforms are unlikely to have helped poverty reduction in rural areas, since the reforms have mostly benefited middle and large private farmers. Similarly, further liberalization of agricultural markets under the EU agreement and World Bank pressure is unlikely to work in favor of the rural poor, who are primarily small farmers and landless agricultural workers. Despite impressive improvements in poverty during the reform period, structural adjustment in Tunisia failed to redress the high unemployment rate the country experienced for more than 20 years. Tunisia's national unemployment rate was at a (likely) underestimated 14%, and was disproportionally high among the poor (22% of the unemployed were poor). One of the reasons for high unemployment rates is likely to be the extremely rigid labor market legislation making it almost impossible to lay off workers. Ironically, this legislation is there to protect workers and make them less vulnerable to poverty, but the laws also prevent potential new entrants entering the labor market and therefore growing out of poverty. High unemployment rates are also related to low investment levels and the wide gap between employment creation in urban as compared to rural areas. Unemployment is also particularly high for young graduates and first-time job seekers. Futhermore, unemployment in Tunisia is likely to become a growing problem as liberalization strengthens with the end of the MFA and the Euro-Med agreement. The labor-intensive sectors such as textile and clothing will be the hardest hit; yet these are the sectors which have benefited the poor the most. As a result, we would expect further liberalization to increase inequality and either freeze poverty trends or worsen poverty rates.
The above discussion suggests three main trends: first, despite undergoing a stabilization and structural adjustment program between 1985 and 2000, that period was characterized by a dramatic reduction in income and capability poverty, with a simultaneous drop in inequality in Tunisia. Secondly, rural areas and the west of the country seem to exhibit strong pockets of poverty, both in terms of income and capability poverty. The rural/urban difference in Tunisia is largely explained by the fact the economic development has concentrated in the north and east of the country (mostly urban).
Finally, the Tunisian government's commitment to social policy, despite its limitations and relative inefficiencies, is likely to have played a crucial role in the impressive poverty reduction the country has experienced. Nonetheless, it is possible that some of the structural reform policies, particularly the food subsidy reform and the agricultural reform, have slowed down poverty reduction in rural areas, and that poverty has been disguised by biased national poverty measures.
Three phenomena explain why the Tunisian government has been so committed to social development and how it managed to implement these policies despite pressures from the World Bank and IMF to reduce government spending. First, social policy is historically an integral part of the Tunisian social contract; second, the Tunisian state had the capacity to negotiate with the World Bank and IMF; and finally, social policy has been a key source of legitimacy as well as a tool of control for the government. 56 However, the eruption of the uprising in late 2010 is expected to undo many of the improvements that Tunisia experienced in the social sector. In fact, even Tunisia, seen by IFIs as the most committed, advanced, and successful reformer in MENA, has also recently (in 2013) "sought help to ease financial woes seen since a revolution toppled the former regime [more than] two years ago." The US $1.8 billion IMF-backed loan seeks to ease financial problems that Tunisia has been experiencing since the revolution started more than three years ago. 
THE DEBATE ABOUT POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND SOCIAL WELFARE IN THE MENA REGION
The issue of economic reform and liberalization on the one hand, and poverty, equity, and social welfare provision in the MENA region on the other, has recently generated some contentious debates. The debate over the relationship between economic reform and poverty levels was triggered by a 2003 paper by Richard Adams, Jr. and John Page. The paper used aggregate cross-country data to argue that despite two decades of economic reform and liberalization, the MENA region "entered the 21 st century with levels of income poverty that were strikingly low,"
58 that "MENA has been able to avoid a large increase in poverty despite 15 years of low economic growth," and that "compared to other developing regions, during the last 20 years the Middle East region has become one of the most equal in terms of income distribution." 59 First, Adams and Page's aggregate cross-country data are not capable of explaining what is, or has been, happening inside each individual country. For example, they treat the rise and simultaneous fall in the incidence of poverty in rural and urban Egypt as "puzzling," with the outcome being "puzzled by a set of apparently contradictory trends" 60 that cannot be simply explained by aggregate cross-country data. Adams and Page thus concluded that "more work is needed to clarify these [and other] issues." 61 Second, poverty figures in MENA are highly contentious and debatable. Adams and Page are among the few who agree with the World Bank that poverty declined in MENA during and after reforms. Most other observers, including many MENA governments themselves, question and doubt such claims. 62 Let us assume for the moment, notwithstanding the lack of accurate figures and a general agreement on the true levels of poverty in the region, that MENA did indeed "enter the 21 st century with levels of income poverty that were strikingly low" compared to other developing countries. Such a statement however, ignores the fact that "the transitional period featured not only meager," even much lower levels of economic growth compared to other developing regions, but also "little change in poverty." 63 In fact, because "little progress was made on the poverty front" in MENA countries during the transition period, "by 2001 approximately 52 million people were poor, an increase in absolute numbers of poor by approximately 11.5 million people, compared with the situation in 1987." 64 Third, the aggregate and positivist paradigm resorted to by Adams and Page to shed light on the link between economic reform and poverty and equity in MENA is a "reductionist approach," tended to oversimplify complex social and political phe-nomena, and thus "fails to unmask the complex processes that underlie" poverty in developing countries in general and in rural areas in particular. Intricate, multifaceted, and complex reasons behind poverty, such as the nature of social capital and social relations, political exclusions, and power asymmetries are therefore completely ignored in the paper. In other words, "Adams and Page's approach is also problematic in terms of generating explanations behind their findings . . . [and] is largely ineffective in understanding what should happen because it only deals with how things are." 65 Fourth, Adams and Page's work says little about the link between economic reform and social welfare provision, a key objective of this article. Their argument, that MENA is more egalitarian than other developing regions and enjoys lower poverty and unemployment rates, may imply that social welfare provision underwent little or no change, and may have even improved during the transitional period. This picture is misleading. As this article has shown, the transitional period in four observed MENA countries, which was associated with economic reforms promoted by the IMF and World Bank to restore macroeconomic balances and change economic structure, has also undermined formal social welfare provisions. Even World Bank officials admit that "The region's social safety nets came under stress as fiscal resources tightened." 66 Fifth, the World Bank recognizes that while inequality levels in MENA are perhaps lower than in many other developing regions, little change or improvement in the distribution of income and wealth has taken place in MENA since the mid1980s. 67 An environment characterized by low growth rates and stable income distribution among a largely growing population suggests that "the rich stay[ed] rich and the poor stay[ed] poor." 68 Both the 2009 Arab Human Development Report 69 and the 2012 UNDP report adopted this view and argue that growth in the region during the transition period lacked "social justice"
70 and "continued to benefit a few . . . mainly benefit[ing] establishment elites and excluded the majority of ordinary citizens." 71 According to the UN Human Development Report, the richest 20% in MENA today control more than 45% of income or expenditure while the poorest 20% control only 7% of income or expenditure. 72 Finally, Adams and Page's approach also failed to take into account the perceptions of Arab populaces with regard to the outcome of reforms in general, regarding poverty and inequity in particular. The fact that insignificant, if any improvement occurred with regard to poverty reduction and income distribution in MENA since the mid-1980s -in an environment characterized by increased corruption, repression, and rent-seeking activities -created a negative impression of economic reforms and human development situation in the region. For example, a 2008 report by the World Bank concluded that the Jordanian "public's perceptions" of the outcome of reforms, including poverty, unemployment, and inequities are negative. 73 The UNDP 2012 Report on the Arab World concurs and argues that perceptions played a key role in triggering the Arab Spring.
However, what may matter more is citizens' perceptions of inequality combined with an increasing sense of insecurity and low expectations for improvement of their position in the future. In fact, some evidence presented in this chapter suggests that pessimism was rising in the Arab region before the Arab Spring." 74 As such, Adams and Page's approach not only failed to predict the outbreak of the Arab Spring, but might also have contributed to it by providing policy makers with a misleading picture regarding the outcome of economic reform in the region. As the World Bank commented:
"some may not think poverty a prominent enough issue in the Middle East and North Africa. . . . This . . . image is misleading one. Although the Middle East and North Africa has a low rate of poverty when compared with other developing regions, the fact remains that one of every five persons there can be considered poor (at the $2 purchasing power parity international poverty line), and that this situation has not improved much since the late 1980s." 75 
CONCLUSION
We have found that in the case of our four countries -Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia -the relationship between economic reform and social welfare in the period between 1983 and 2004 was complex and mixed. In Tunisia, the state did not disengage from social provisioning, rather there was an expansion of state provisioning which contributed to an unambiguous improvement in poverty and social welfare during the reform period, contrary to our hypothesis. Although the strongest gains in poverty alleviation in Tunisia were made before the period of IMF and World Bank reforms began, gains continued during the reform period with poverty falling to 4.1% in 2000. Throughout the reform period, social spending by the government remained at around 19% of GDP, which amounted to a doubling in real terms and an increase in per capita spending, whilst the minimum wage also increased. At the same time, inequality improved with the Gini coefficient decreasing from 0.430 to 0.406.
Although Tunisia, like our other three countries, was under pressure from the IMF and World Bank to reform elements of the social contract -especially food subsidies, the strong Tunisian state, and bureaucracy -it was able to argue against this. Reforms that were made, such as a reduction in food subsidies, were counterbalanced by other measures such as an increase in the minimum wage and the creation in 1986 of the National Program for Aid to Needy Families. However, despite Tunisia's impressive gains in poverty reduction and social welfare improvement, there was a much 73 greater reduction in urban poverty than in rural poverty due to agricultural reforms' mainly benefiting larger farmers. In addition, as in our other three countries, unemployment remained a pressing social problem, estimated to be 14% in Tunisia. In our other three country studies, trends in poverty and social welfare during the reform period are much more complex. Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco all started their reform programs with a period of austerity under IMF stabilization programs. This involved cutbacks in public expenditure; freezing of public sector wages, salaries, and employment; reductions in subsidies; and increases in taxation. In all cases this, not unexpectedly, led to an initial increase in poverty and a decline in social welfare.
After their initial stabilization phase, with its adverse effects on poverty and social welfare, Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt were able to generate periods of growth that led to an improvement in poverty. Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan's growth phases were not sustained, and as growth collapsed, poverty again increased in all three countries.
In summary, what our studies show is that the early phase of stabilization under the IMF program usually leads to a temporary increase in poverty. However, this is short-lived, as a successful stabilization helped to eventually generate a period of economic growth. All four countries show that poverty reduction is closely associated with labor-intensive periods of growth. But we have also seen that, with the exception of Tunisia, growth has not been sustained. As growth declines, poverty again increases. We have shown that growth alone is insufficient to alleviate poverty. The pattern of growth is also critically important. The Tunisian pattern of growth has shown that intensive rather than extensive growth and growth in the tradable rather than the non-tradable sectors is crucial for a sustained improvement in poverty. Tunisia's ability to generate such a pattern of growth with sustained export-led and labor-intensive growth was due to the fact that it has a strong developmental state that was able to pick and support winning industries and preserve its social contract.
